THE SCIENTIFIC PARADIGM OF ISLAMIC EDUCATION MANAGEMENT: PHENOMENOLOGY PERSPECTIVE by Buckley, Philip & Irawan, Irawan
THE SCIENTIFIC PARADIGM OF ISLAMIC EDUCATION 
MANAGEMENT: PHENOMENOLOGY PERSPECTIVE 
Philip Buckley 
Department of Philosophy McGill University 
Leacock Building, Room 414, 855 Sherbrooke Street West 
Montreal, Quebec, H3A 2T7, Canada Tel. 514-398-6060 
Email: philip.buckley@mcgill.ca  
Irawan  
State Islamic University (UIN) Sunan Gunung Djati Bandung, Indonesia  
Jl. A. H. Nasution No. 105 Bandung, West Java 
Email: Iraonetea@yahoo.com  
ABSTRACT 
This paper intends to explore the possibility that phenomenology can be 
used as one of the foundations of scientific epistemology of Islamic 
education management. Scientific management of Islamic education would 
not be sufficient if only positivistic approached scientifically. Behaviors that 
contain messages of moral, theological and ideological embraced by 
managers, implementers and users of Islamic educational institutions are very 
complicated. To be able to describe these phenomena with a reasonable and 
until the deeply meaning (eidos), so phenomenological approach is needed. 
This approach can be used as a basis in developing others the science of 
Islamic education management. The science of Islamic education 
management can have a number of scientific fields (The science of diniyyah, 
madrassas, Islamic schools, and Islamic higher education management) and 
gave birth to a number of expertise (administrative staff, headmaster and 
superintendent at the madrasah level). 
Keywords: Paradigm, Phenomenology, Islamic Education Management 
ABSTRAK  
Tulisan ini bermaksud mengeksplorasi sejumlah kemungkinan bahwa fenomenologi dapat 
dijadikan sebagai salah satu landasan epistemologi keilmuan manajemen pendidikan Islam. 
Keilmuan manajemen pendidikan Islam tidak akan memadai jika hanya didekati secara 
ilmiah positivistik. Perilaku-perilaku yang mengandung pesan-pesan moral, teologis dan 
ideologis yang dianut oleh para pengelola, pelaksana dan pengguna lembaga pendidikan Islam 
sangat kompleks dan rumit. Agar dapat menggambarkan fenomena-fenomena tersebut dengan 
wajar dan sampai kepada makna yang tterdalam (eidos) maka diperlukan pendekatan 
fenomenologis. Pendekatan ini dapat dijadikan sebagai landasan dalam mengembangkan ilmu 
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manajemen pendidikan Islam. Ilmu manajemen pendidikan Islam bisa memiliki sejumlah 
bidang keilmuan (ilmu manajemen madrasah, pesantren, diniyyah dan perguruan tinggi 
Islam) dan melahirkan sejumlah keahlian (tenaga administrasi di madrasah, kepala 
madrasah dan pengawas madrasah).  
Kata Kunci : Paradigma, Fenomenologi, Manajemen Pendidikan Islam  
INTRODUCTION  
Around the year of 2009s, a study of Islamic Education Management often 
done in almost all Islamic Religious Higher Education Institution (PTKI) in 
Indonesia. This phenomenon is gaining momentum after a number of State 
of Islamic Institute (IAIN) (Jakarta, Yogyakarta, Malang and Bandung) in the 
time frame of 2004-2006s, successfully transformed institutional and 
management become State of Islamic University (UIN). In the same year, 
Majors of Department of Islamic Education (Kependidikan Islam) was 
renamed the Department/Studies Program of Islamic Management 
(Manajemen Pendidikan Islam) (PMA No. 39 of 2009). Since then, a number 
of Islamic Universities (UIN, IAIN, STAIN and other STAI) began to open 
MPI Programs and rename KI Study Programs be MPI program. 
In 2012s, the Faculty of Tarbiyah and Teacher Training of UIN Sunan 
Gunung Jati Bandung changed the KI program into the Department of MPI 
and got accreditation A in the 2013. In this year, the Post Graduate Program 
of UIN Sunan Gunung Jati Bandung was opened for Magister Program of 
Islamic Education Management. Until the year 2013, there are approximately 
40 MPI graduate programs throughout Indonesia scattered UIN, IAIN, 
STAIN, and some Islamic Higher Education Partikelir Indonesia. In that 
year, they agreed to make an MPI graduate program Communication Forum 
in Indonesia. On May 24, 2014, they declared the establishment of the 
Association of Islamic Education Management Scholars (ASMAPI) 
Indonesia in Bandung. This association is independent and focused on 
scientific development and Islamic education management in practice. The 
first Conference of ASMAPI-Indonesia take place at Bandung on 25-27 
November 2015. In 2015 changed be ASPIMAPI-Indonesia (The Indonesian 
Association of Islamic Education Management Scholars, Professions, and 
Institutions).   
This paper intends to respond to the rapid development of Islamic 
education management study to formulate a foundation of epistemological 
scientific MPI, so that MPI had a basic science that clearly so that its 
existence as a science recognized as part of science education Islam (Islamic 
Education/Tarbiyah science) and a branch of Islamic Sciences (Studies). 
Epistemological approaches that are used to build the science of Islamic 
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education management in this paper is phenomenology. In phenomenology, 
the whole event, events, actions and activities of management of education in 
Islamic educational institutions into ground of data construct theories of 
Islamic education management. The basic of epistemic principles are then 
formulated a design of MPI-based research methodology of phenomenology, 
the paradigm of natural and typicaly the scientific Indonesian MPI. 
DISCUSSION 
The Spirituality of Management  
So many management change projects that integrate spirituality in their 
organizational development. This spiritualization of corporations is not a 
return to Weber's traditional mode of legitimating, but rather an integrated 
part of a modern project of aesthetization and spiritualization of the 
discourse of management. There are the focus on values in the corporations 
(i.e., to make them be conscious of values and to refer to the vision and 
missions of the corporation) is made easy through the creation of collective 
spiritual values expressed through New Age mythology (Rendtorff in 
Koslowski, 2010. p. 19). 
Spiritualized management allows for personal development and 
individual self-realization in corporations, rather than reducing human beings 
to work machines; employees are taken seriously as complex beings. From 
the New Age perspective of Eastern mythology, the justification for business 
ethics and corporate social responsibility are based in ideas of the soul. Each 
individual should demonstrate the capacity to take responsibility for him or 
herself, for their community, and for society. The anthropologist Karen Lisa 
Salmon argues that this position can easily be integrated into a neoliberal 
conception of the economy, because it is based on individualism. We see that 
it starts with the feelinas and emotions of individuals and their spiritual 
understandings of themselves and their responsibility. Moreover, it is a 
dogma of the New Age movement in management that personal success is 
based on the holistic integration of spiritual, private, and professional life. 
This is why management has become ―whole-life management‖. Spiritual 
management is based on a kind of the law of Karma, where the journey into 
the self contributes to the enrichment of organizational life. Whole-life 
management helps to integrate the individual in the cosmos, to bring about a 
closer relationship between the self and the world. The idea is that whole-life 
management integrates personal desire and the sense for the community so 
that the journey into the self will in the end, be better for the common good 
(Rendtorff in Koslowski, 2010, p. 38). 
An example of this kind of whole-life management can be found in the 
book Corporate Religion by the Danish marketing expert, Jesper Kunde. 
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Kunde is a very good example of the New Age approach in his 
dissatisfaction with the secularization of business and with the demotivation 
of those working under increasing bureaucratization. His work can be 
conceived as an effort to reckon with the dissolution of Protestant ethics in 
modern business. Kunde argues that clearly focused strategies, which are 
based on strong values, are conditions for corporate survival in a society of 
fragmenting values. Both employees and customers have to be bonded 
emotionally to the corporation, if the corporation is going to have a chance 
for survival and growth in a competitive world economy (Rendtorff in 
Koslowski, 2010, p. 38). 
Kunde argues for a return to a religiously based corporation and a 
strategy of corporate religion that is not only based in rational and economic 
bottom-line values, but that also grounds strategy and management 
holistically in the qualitative and emotional values of the corporation. 
According to this conception, "religion" (conceived as common visions, 
ideals, and ideology) is necessary for creating a well-functioning modern 
corporation. In a number of case studies of corporations such as Microsoft, 
Coca Cola, Walt Disney and The Body Shop, Kunde shows how these 
corporations can be said to operate according to a concept of corporate or 
brand religion, where the corporation is organized around strong common 
values and where the consumer is strongly emotionally related to the 
products (Rendtorff in Koslowski, 2010, p. 39). 
This idea of corporate religiosity can be considered as a response to the 
lack of spirituality in modern management strategies-from scientific to total 
quality management. It is also a reaction toward the growing fragmentation 
and dissolution of work life in times where the Protestant ethos has been 
weakened. Without corporate religion it is not possible to tie together a 
corporation, which encounters many secular and multicultural challenges, to 
its corporate identity and unified culture. In order to cope with the loss of 
meaning in modern society, Kunde presents strong and very well-formulated 
values and values-driven management as responses to the problems of 
leadership in corporations. The firm should work with immaterial values in 
values-driven management by formulating its vision and mission in order to 
ensure commitment and action from its employees. The conscious religious 
strategy of values-driven management is about belief, community, strong 
management, and commitment and engagement in work. The product of the 
firm should be branded as something very special so that it is not just some 
other thing to buy: It should be endorsed by consumers as something vital 
for their identities and existence (Rendtorff in Koslowski, 2010, p. 39). 
A very classical example is the American motorbike corporation Harley 
Davidson, which can be characterized as a corporation with a strong brand 
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that understands the necessity to cultivate immaterial corporate values should 
be viewed as a good thing. It shows that a company has a clear idea and that 
this brand has been communicated efficiently to the environments. Kunde's 
concept of corporate religion is not designed to be cynical or nihilistic, but a 
rather loose concept, in the sense that "religion" means to have values and 
believe them. I think that this concept of corporate religion is, however, still 
problematic because the metaphor changes the corporation info a kind of 
religious sect with all the implications of manipulation, domination, and 
ideology that such a characterization entails (Rendtorff in Koslowski, 2010, 
p. 40). 
Even though they are not necessarily better than other motorbike 
products, a Harley Davidson motorcycle is considered as much more than a 
simple motorbike. It is rather a lifestyle signifier, a form of identification, and 
possessing one is even viewed by many as the key to freedom and a part of 
achieving the American dream. At a time when the corporation was about to 
go bankrupt, Harley Davidson invented a new strategy whereby the firm 
focused on brand value, which, in this context, we might call the religious 
and emotional image of the corporation. They actively worked to create a 
community where customers and employees became emotionally linked to 
the firm. We might even say that they were encouraged to become disciples 
of the congregation of Harley Davidson (Rendtorff in Koslowski, 2010, p. 
40). 
Kunde draws our attention to the branding and strategy of the 
cosmetics company The Body Shop. The Body Shop operates as a political 
company, which has been able to combine the political and the religious 
content in the image of its products. Their brand is riot only about selling 
cosmetics but they are perceived as a knowledge-based company, which uses 
its product to encourage an environmental consciousness and lifestyle among 
its customers. With the concept of "caring cosmetics". The Body Shop has 
produced cosmetics as a specific brand value for customers. The firm uses its 
products to signal larger political values and ideals and to connect them with 
strong emotional content. In this sense, The Body Shop has turned its green 
profile into a religion (Rendtorff in Koslowski, 2010, p. 40). 
We can mention many other examples of companies that have worked 
to foster immaterial values, who have increased the emotional significance of 
their brand and their products for customers, and that also have intensified 
employee motivation. As mentioned previously, it is the task of corporate 
religion to link the customers to the firm by emphasizing that the products of 
the firm are expressions of attitudes and values. In this context, corporations 
organize events and other initiatives (e.g., making slogans that contribute to 
the promotion of a lifestyle through the image of the firm) in order to ensure 
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the loyalty and emotional binding of individuals to the firm (Rendtorff in 
Koslowski, 2010, p. 41). 
This ideological and strategic concept of corporate religion as the basis 
for promoting the legitimacy of corporations in modern society is based on a 
number of simple values and statements,  which are imbued through all, 
levels of the organization through its mission statement. This mission 
statement should function like a Bible for the corporation. In the fight to 
establish an emotional engagement among employees and customers in the 
firm, it is important to work with simple and strong formulations of values in 
order to give the vision and mission of the firm strategic power and weight. 
Moreover, it is important to emphasize that corporate religion, based on a 
powerful and charismatic style of leadership, is an important condition for 
realizing the values of the firm. As a strong leader, the manager and CEO 
must present him- or herself as an incarnation and symbol of the values and 
personality of the totality of the corporation (Rendtorff in Koslowski, 2010, 
p. 41). 
In strong opposition to the idea of corporate religion we find the 
existentialist approach to management, which considers corporate religion as 
purely manipulative. This existentialist approach to business ethics has been 
proposed recently by a number of authors, including the provocative young 
consultant Kirstine Andersen, in her book Kierkegaard. These authors are 
trying to apply existentialist thinking to the relations of management and 
work life. An existentialist approach to management can, at the same time, be 
considered as continuing to search for a deeper meaning to business life. 
Existentialism in management refuses to reestablish a mystical new 
spirituality, but rather the aim is to make the existentialist search for 
individual meaning the basis for the social legitimacy of the firm (Rendtorff 
in Koslowski, 2010, p. 41). 
From a critical view of capitalism we can, however, ask whether there 
is an existentialist philosophy of management. Critical authors would state 
that existentialism and management cannot be combined and that this 
approach is an indication of an ideological use of existentialism to justify 
management. They would say that there is no room for singular existence 
and search for meaning in the large contemporary economic organizations 
and social systems. It looks very difficult to reestablish the individual 
meaning of life within the modern organization of work and it seems 
impossible to unite the private search for existential and religious meaning 
with specific work requirements in large organizations. This existentialist 
approach can be seen as a response to a Protestant ethics based on the search 
for meaning in organizations with the recognition of the conditions of 
economic life in modernity (Rendtorff in Koslowski, 2010, p. 42). 
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Inspiration for basing corporate legitimacy on the existentialist calling 
can be found in the work of Soren Kierkegaard. Kirstine Andersen argues 
that Kierkegaard contributes to understanding management and governance 
by providing a poetic language of the working life. In existentialist 
philosophy, the search for dialogue and communication implies confidence 
and engagement with other human beings. Existentialism takes seriously the 
original signification of being a director, namely to search for a direction in 
existential terms. The manager is somebody who points to the direction of 
life and the experiences of life in organizations are concrete and existential. 
Existentialism can help us to perceive this concrete life in organizations. In 
the existential sense. managers are confronted with something larger than 
themselves when they have to make important decisions. Managers are 
choosing themselves and the situation when they make large decisions. They 
would have to deal with their professional life from the point of view of their 
existential engagement. Because it is impossible to ignore personal life and 
existence in professional life, its legitimacy is dependent on a harmonious 
relation between the personal and private convictions of individuals. 
Moreover, existential management is about recognizing the importance of 
human dignity and respect for employees and other stakeholders as human 
beings with infinite value (Rendtorff in Koslowski, 2010, p. 42). 
Applying existentialist philosophy to management we can resume the 
existentialist challenge of management: The task of the manager is to come 
to terms with the fact that his/her role is a condition of life that he cannot 
escape, which is also a fact for the other human beings who are subordinate. 
Given this condition of his existence, the manager cannot avoid being forced 
to become him- or herself with a certain character, set of values, and 
particular conceptions of life. Indeed, it is an existentialist requirement fact 
that the ethical challenge is greater than the individual. There is a requirement 
of the ideality of the infinite in the ethics of existentialism, which assumes 
that moral and ethical choice involves existential engagement for the 
individual. As such. the strategy of legitimacy in existentialism implies a 
return to the personal conscience and engagement of the individual behind 
the mask of professional life as the basis for real professional commitment 
and responsibility (Rendtorff in Koslowski, 2010, p. 43). 
As a modern version of Protestant ethics, existentialism puts the value 
of personal responsibility for one's action in the center of corporate 
legitimacy. But at the same time, the kind of existentialism that is proposed is 
in danger of loosing its roots in the critical attitude towards corporate life and 
becoming a new philosophy of meaning in the corporation, which after all is 
based on New Age philosophy. This would be the end of existentialism 
which means that the approach can indeed be criticized. Can we really build 
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professional life on personal values? Isn't it better to work with strict 
separation of spheres of values, of ethics, law, economics, and religion? In 
this sense an existentialist turn in business ethics is dangerous because it 
moves from formal rules of professional life towards individual emotions and 
conceptions that are outside the objectivity of professionalism. However, the 
counter argument is that you cannot separate personal responsibility from 
public functions and that government and management is a kind of decision 
making, which implies great personal responsibility, accountability, and 
integrity (Rendtorff in Koslowski, 2010, p. 43). 
The question arises whether this reintroduction of the individual and 
his or her responsibility to the center of management in the existentialist 
approach inspired by Kierkegaard, does not hide some new forms of 
subjugation and domination that pose the danger of becoming a new kind of 
corporate religion. This may require analyzing these new kinds of 
management as forms of power. As Michel Foucault has shown, power is not 
always coercive. It has to be more subtle to remain strong. Governmental 
power can, in this sense, include responsibility and spirituality by 
manipulating the liberty of the employees. There is not, as such, a 
contradiction between power and liberty. On the contrary, power becomes 
more intense and efficient if it is not limited to individual initiative (i.e., the 
possibility to decide and to resist) but rather is based on individual freedom, 
action, and the search for meaning in life. The placement of the individual in 
the center of management in corporate religion and in the existentialist 
search for meaning can, therefore, still imply powerful discipline and 
coercion. Thus, modern technologies of management have understood that. 
it is important to insist on spiritualization and individualization of 
management. As the sociologist Richard Sennett-a close friend of Michel 
Foucault-has shown, the organization of work leaves organization 
hierarchical structure of traditional government in order to substitute this 
power with a more subtle, personalized, and polycentric form of 
management. Without opposing the importance of an existentialist criticism 
of the concept of corporate religion, these contemporary approaches are very 
powerful as expressions of the hidden discipline of management technologies 
(Rendtorff in Koslowski, 2010, p. 44). 
Accordingly, we can emphasize three important dimensions: 1) A 
general theory of organization, which is built on systems theory and poly-
contextual understandings of the relation between firms and their 
environments. 2) Conceptualization of a concept of leadership as opposed to 
management, which implies a discussion of the role of the good leader and 
how the virtues of integrity, dignity, and judgment can be determinants for 
the right development of organizations. 3) Understanding how the strength 
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and power of discipline are hidden in the management technologies of 
corporate religion and existentialism. The general conclusion is, therefore, 
that these elements of theories and conceptions of the philosophy of 
management can help contextualize the importance of the emergence of 
corporate citizenship, CSR, business ethics, and values-driven management in 
the Danish and Indonesia context. 
Moral Goodness in Education 
Kierkegaard stands as an opponent of Hegel and all who seek to find  
systematic scientific explanation of human existence and behaviour including 
in education of field. He stands see moral goodness as the most important 
thing in life and also in education. With regard to Hegel and the scientists, 
Kierkegaard is relenting an explanation of human existence impossible in 
human life. It is this uncertainty and risk which provide the material for 
human freedom. While there may not be any logical reason why men could 
not be both free and have comprehensive, proven knowledge (and not 
merely beliefs) Kierkegaard thinks that human nature is psychologically or 
spiritually so constructed that freedom and absolute knowledge or certainty 
are incompatible. Human beings require difficulty, uncertainty, conflict and 
the like in order to develop a moral and spiritual disposition (Curtis & Mays, 
1978, p. 1). 
With regard to science Kierkegaard fears that the tendency towards 
objectivity through observation will delude man into thinking that he 
understands himself through understanding his physiology or anatomy. All 
such scientific methods become particularly dangerous and pernicious when 
they encroach upon the spiritual field. Plants, animals, and stars may be 
handled in that way, but to handle the spirit of man in such a fashion is 
blasphemy which only weakens moral and religious passion. Man is 
qualitatively different from plants and animals (Curtis & Mays, 1978, p. 2).  
Kierkegaard writes, ― My task is a Socratic task, to revise the definition 
of what it is to be a Christian‖. Kierkegaard back on the study of nature and 
science in order to study man and ethical-religious aspects of  life. These are 
the only subjects worthy of the regard of free agents. Like Socrates, 
Kierkegaard spurns public life in order to serve his fellow citizens as a gadfly, 
calling into question the cliches and popular dogmas of the day. One can find 
striking parallels of Socratic ignorance, irony, introspection and maieuticism 
in Kierkegaard‘s writings as well as in his wider public behaviour. The aspect 
of Socrates' thought that Kierkegaard has most ingeniously appropriated to 
his own uses is the doctrine of moral knowledge: Virtue is knowledge. 
Kierkegaard appropriated this doctrine, but in doing so he changed it 
radically. For Socrates morality is thoroughly intellectualized. It is made a 
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science. The emotions and irrational part of the soul are eliminated. For 
Socrates, to know the good is tantamount to doing the good whenever the 
occasion calls for it. Weakness of will (akrasia), as is well-known, is a concept 
conspicuously absent in the Socratic dialogues. Wrong doing is simply 
involuntary, due to ignorance. ―My own opinion is more or less this: no wise 
man believes that anyone willingly sins or willingly perpetuates any base or 
evil act; they know very well that every base or evil action is committed 
involuntarily‖ (Curtis & Mays, 1978, p. 3). 
Kierkegaard's doctrine of morality is related to Socrates' dictum 
conversely. For Kierkegaard ―virtue is not knowledge‖ but rather 
―knowledge is virtue‖. That is, unless the knower approaches the subject 
matter of ethics (and religion) with a good will he will not understand the 
subject matter. Unless a person is already committed to the good, he will 
never significantly understand what morality is about. Unless one is already 
striving to live within the light he already has, he will not be given any further 
light. This relation of will to knowledge has wider implications than the 
above suggests. For Kierkegaard all knowledge involves volition. It does so 
in as much as in every act of knowing interpretation is necessary and every 
interpretation involves, at some level, decision. There is no such thing as 
purely neutral perception. All perception involves interpretation, seeing 
something 'as something' and from a particular perspective. According to 
Kierkegaard, we are responsible for the interpretations we place on our 
sensations. This is part of what being a free agent means (Curtis & Mays, 
1978, p. 3). 
The Kierkegaard's theory of 'The Principle of Cognitive Particularity', 
has affinities with the Latin, 'Quidquid cognoscitur, per modum cognoscentis 
cognoscitur'. That is, whatever is known must be known in a way appropriate to 
the knower. Everything I know, I know by virtue of my situation, capacities, 
and choices. There is no such thing as knowing simpliciter. The Principle of 
Cognitive Particularity is only part of the truth. There is a second 
epistemological principle which I find implicit in Kierkegaard‘s ideas, a 
principle which constitutes the unformulated backdrop againts which his 
theory of subjectivity is to be understood. I call this Kierkegaard‘s Cognitive 
Principle is known must be known in a mode appropriate to the thing 
known. This principle recognizes that there are objective structures in reality 
which, if certain results are to obtain, must be adhered to. This principle is 
especially applicable to competence-knowledge (knowing-how, learning 
skills). If I would bring about the state of affairs of my riding a bicycle, I 
must obey certain laws of nature, correlating my innate capacities and 
personal peculiarities with a specific two-wheeled machine. Unless there is an 
attitude or mood of obedience present I shall not learn to ride a bicycle. 
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There is no logical necessity in correlating a mode of approach with a skill. 
Nature could have been different. However, this is how things are. There is a 
certain orderliness in nature which requires recognition if any learning is to 
take place. Learning is not an arbitrary process. There are objective factors. It 
should be clear that the Cognitive Principle are not contradictory but 
complement one another (Curtis & Mays, 1978, p. 4). 
The next factor which we should note in approaching Kierkegaard's 
epistemology is that learning (or developed knowing) is progressive. In order 
to understand a complex subject, I must necessarily understand its simpler 
components. In order to be able to solve problems of calculus I must 
understand simpler arithmetic. In order to use words to write an essay in 
philosophy of education, I must know how to use words in ordinary 
language. This is true in spite of some appearances to the contrary. For 
Kierkegaard his doctrine of 'stages of existence' relies on this principle. 
Unless a person goes through an 'aesthetic stage' (where pleasure and self-
interest dominate), he cannot appreciate or understand an ethical way of life. 
Unless he has lived in an ethical stage, he cannot appreciate or understand 
religious existence. Unless he understands through participation what it 
means to be religious, he cannot understand what it means to be a Christian. 
Existence has a certain teleology. Unless a person works through the 
particular dilemmas and tasks which he finds at hand, he will never make 
progress to a further and more complex state of existing (Curtis & Mays, 
1978, p. 4).  
Next we must consider the specific difference in Kierkegaard's thought 
between 'subject' and 'object'. In every relationship of knowledge a subject 
knows an object. When the manner of presentation is emphasized in the 
knowing relationship we call the relation 'objective'. What is being focused 
upon is the fact itself. It is a fact regardless of how I feel about it. It is true 
that I may not understand it unless I approach it in a certain mood 
(Cognitive Principle), but here the focus is on what is known, not on how I 
know it. Kierkegaard readily grants that all science must be, in this sense, 
objective: logic, natural science, psychology, mathematics, economics and the 
like are to be treated objectively so far as possible. However, sometimes it is 
more appropriate to focus attention on the knower rather than the object 
known. Or rather what the object demands is that the knower consider his 
feelings, his subjective state in the knowledge relation (Curtis & Mays, 1978, 
p. 4). 
Let me try to illustrate this. If I want to know whether Germany 
invaded Holland in the Second World War or Holland Germany, I make a 
proper study of the records available. I assess the evidence impartially. My 
feelings on how I wish things had been — say I am a German youth who 
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wants to be proud of my Fatherland — has nothing to do with the matter, 
except in so far as it motivates me to make the study in the first place and 
concentrate carefully on the nature of the evidence. I cannot interpret the 
evidence simply any way I wish to. To make the wish father to the facts is 
simply subjectivism —something Kierkegaard has often been accused of 
through misinterpretation. Any objective mode of inquiry is appropriate to 
objective knowledge. My feelings about how I wish things were make not the 
slightest difference to how they are. I must strive for impartiality and 
distinterestedness in my judgment (Curtis & Mays, 1978, p. 5). 
However, there is a large zone of life where my feelings do make I lie 
decisive difference and ought to make the decisive difference. This is the area 
of life which is most important to me personally: i lie general area of ethical 
and religious knowledge. Here the way I feel about things makes all the 
difference. My intuitions, passions, and partiality are vital. This is not merely 
because I do not have the necessary facts with which to operate impartially 
—though this is part of the situation. It is rather that knowing here involves 
a passionate dialectic between the knower and the subject matter. Even if I 
had proofs for the objective reality of religious and cilileal propositions, I 
would dismiss them and even detest them I w, cruse they would tend to 
falsify the mode of subjectivity. Ethical and religious truths are not known 
'objectively' but only subjectively (Curtis & Mays, 1978, p. 5).  
Kierkegaard calls ethical-religious problems 'existential' problems. He 
uses the term 'existence' here to distinguish a higher mode of being from 'life' 
or merely living. Unreflective, uncommitted p-ople have life but do not exist 
as self-conscious potentiated persons. Self-consciousness, that which 
transforms life into existence, arises through the choices, the commitments 
we make (Curtis & Mays, 1978, p. 4-5).  
One may object that there is a certain ambiguity here. Earlier we said 
that all perception qua interpretation involves choice. Hence, everyone makes 
commitments of one sort or another. This is true. The difference between 
the person who merely has life and the person who exists is like the 
difference between the hill and the mountain. It may be impossible to point 
to any exact line where the one ends and the other begins. Kierkegaard's 
concern is to articulate clearly defined types not because we ever find any 
instances of these types but because it may help us understand what our lives 
are really about (Curtis & Mays, 1978, p. 6). 
The choices we make involve our whole being. They are not simply an 
intellectual matter. Our reason, emotions, and imagination are all involved. A 
person wills as a whole unitary being. Hence, it is wrong to elevate reason 
above the other aspects of man in valuing man. The true springs of action are 
deep within man, bound up with the passions (emotions and intuitions). The 
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elevation of reason where it does not belong usually produces merely a state 
of deceptive rationalization. 'In existence thought is by no means higher than 
imagination and feeling. In existence all the factors must be co-present 
(Curtis & Mays, 1978, p. 6). 
Because ethical-religious choices affect us fundamentally, they cannot 
help but involve the emotions. Passionless thinking about these matters is a 
contradiction of a sort. As Kierkegaard sees it: 
All existential problems are passionate problems, for when existence is 
interpenetrated with reflection it generates passion. To think about existential 
problems in such a way as to leave out the passion, is tantamount to not thinking 
about them at all, since it is to forget the point, which is that the thinker is himself an 
existing individual (Lowry, 1941. P. 64).  
Let me try to illustrate what Kierkegaard is getting at in the distinction 
between objective and subjective knowledge. Consider the proposition, 'All 
men are mortal'. We all acknowledge the truth of this assertion whether we 
like it or not. It is a fact, objectively true. It is so incontrovertible that 
although it is not provable, it can be safely used as a major premise in the 
classical example of a deductive argument. Although I have heard this 
sentence uttered hundreds of time, I have never heard anymore manifest 
much emotion about it (Curtis & Mays, 1978, p. 6).  
Now consider the statement. ‗You are going to die within a few days' 
(or alternatively, 'Your loved one is going to die within a few days') uttered by 
an authority (e.g. your doctor or a kidnapper). If you consider this assertion, 
no doubt it will arouse in you a great deal more emotion than the general 
proposition about t fie general mortality of mankind. You are forced to think 
with some feeling about what the implications of your death will be. What 
will your wife do? What will your children do without you? How will your 
work be judged? If you do not raise questions like I hese, if you do not feel 
intense emotion at the threat to your (your loved one's) being, I think we 
would be justified in concluding I here is something inhuman about you. 
Such is the remarkable case of Camas' Stranger. It may be possible to 
produce individuals who are like the Stranger, disinterested about their own 
and other's spiritual welfare, regarding themselves as objects, but it is not a 
good thing. There are some things about which it is positively inhuman to be 
objective. Unless I respond with appropriate emotion i o certain facts, I 
cannot be said to have understood what is involved in those facts (Curtis & 
Mays, 1978, p. 7). 
The next step in our analysis of Kierkegaard's theory of subjectivity is 
to distinguish its epistemological aspect from its ethical aspect. We have 
already noted in our discussion of the Cognitive Principle and the subjective-
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objective distinction some features of I lie epistemological aspect, especially 
that there is a class of relationships between the person (subject) and the 
cognitive object in which the relationship, if it is to be a satisfactory one, 
must be subjective. Here the emphasis is strongly on the mode of approach. 
Indeed, Kierkegaard uses the adjective 'true' to characterize the relationship 
regardless of the objective truth value of what is believed. 
When the question of truth is raised in an objective manner, reflection is directed 
objectively to the truth, as an object to which the knower is related. Reflection is not 
focused upon the relationship, however, but upon the question of whether it is the I 
rush to which the knower is related. If only the object to which he is related is the 
truth, the subject is accounted to be in the truth. When the question of truth is raised 
subjectively, reflection is directed subjectivity to the nature of the individual‘s 
relationship; if only the mode of this relationship in the truth, the individual is in the 
truth, even if he should happen to be thus related to what is not true (Lowry, 1941, p. 
64). 
Kierkegaard illustrates what he means by the parable of the two 
worshippers. 
If one who lives in the midst of Christendom goes up to the house of God, the 
house of the true God, with the true conception of God in his knowledge, and prays 
in a false spirit; and one who lives in an idolatrous community prays with the entire 
passion of the infinite, although his eyes rest upon the image of an idol: where is 
there most truth? The one prays in truth to God though he worships an idol; the 
other prays falsely to the true God, and hence worships in fact an idol (Lowry, 1940, 
p. 36). 
 
In existential matters, the mode of approach is decisive. Only the 
person who has the right attitude is in truth. The corollary of this thesis is 
that the proper 'how' leads inexorably to the right 'what'. That is, the properly 
subjective person will, letting his conscience be his guide, arrive nearer and 
nearer to a correct objective understanding. As Kierkegaard writes in his 
journals: 
In all that is usually said about Johannes Climacus being purely subjective and so on, 
people have forgotten, in addition to everything else concrete about him, that in one 
of the last sections he shows that the curious thing is: that there is a 'how' which has 
this quality, that if it is truly given, then the 'what' is also given; and that it is the 'how' 
of 'faith'. Here, quite certainly, we have inwardness at its maximum proving to be 
objectivity once again. And this is an aspect of the principle of subjectivity, which, so 
far as I know, has never before been presented or worked out (Journals 45).  
We turn now from the form of subjectivity, the epistemological aspect, 
to the content of subjectivity: the ethical aspect (i.e. ethical in a broad sense, 
as including all existential concerns). Climacus makes a distinction between 
essential knowledge and accidental knowledge. Essential knowledge relates to 
one's personal existence. Accidental knowledge is related to the intellect 
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alone. It has no fundamental significance for my life. 'Only ethical and 
ethicoreligious knowledge has an essential relationship to the existence of the 
knower.' The essential-accidental distinction seems to be based on 
Kierkegaard's anthropology. Man is essentially dual. On the one hand, he is 
body-soul, a highly developed animal. On the other hand, he is spirit, that is a 
free agent capable of making ethical and religious decisions, capable of self-
knowledge. In being spirit he is higher than the animal world. Implicit in this 
priority of I lie spiritual over the animal is an ordering of values. Whatever is 
more distinctly spiritual is of a higher value than what is less distinctly 
spiritual (Curtis & Mays, 1978, p. 8-9). 
Sometimes Kierkegaard calls these dual properties of man ‗infinity-
finitude', `eternal-temporal', `freedom-necessity'. The goal of life is to 
become as spiritual as possible, to die to the flesh in order to live in the spirit. 
Only the spiritual man is the free man. He is free from the bondage of guilt, 
free for service to God and man.  At he top of the value-hierarchy is the 
religious existence, spirituality at its pinnacle, but the ethical is the necessary 
condition for the religious and is incorporated within it (Curtis & Mays, 1978, 
p. 9). 
Realizing one's ethical-religious task is a lifetime affair. One is never 
done with it. Hence there is no time to become complacent about results, but 
rather the individual must constantly be looking forward towards an ideal 
self. Climacus sums up the ethical religious task in saying that the individual 
ought to commit himself hsolutely to the absolute and relatively to 
everything relative. That which is essential to his highest development is his 
God-relationship. Everything else is of secondary importance (Curtis & 
Mays, 1978, p. 9).  
Before leaving our analysis of subjectivity we must examine a final 
claim made by Kierkegaard, the claim that 'subjectivity‘ is truth. We have 
already noted that Kierkegaard has often been accused of subjectivism. The 
charge is founded on a misunderstanding of this epigram. Kierkegaard 
himself is not altogether free from blame, for there are passages which lend 
themselves to such an interpretation. I can only hope that my analysis has 
shown this to be a rather crude and poor interpretation of a more complex 
iheory. It is not at all the case that my subjectivity determines objective truth, 
but it is simply that subjectivity is the only way to approach the truth or to 
understand the truth. Concerning existensial concerns passionate concern is 
the only appropriate expression. Just as objective truth is expressed as a 
correspondence between, wence and state of affairs, so subjective truth is a 
correspondence between the individual's inner disposition and the ideal he 
insiders to be true. Subjective truth is the mutual fit of the personality with 
the object of belief. Whereas the image that comes to mind in objective truth 
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is a photograph of a state of affairs, the image expressing subjective truth is 
one of a work of art. The individual with his eyes on the ideal, uses 
umagination, reflection, the emotions, and above all, the will in order to 
create a personal  existence approximating the ideal. 'The only fundamental 
basis for understanding is that one himself becomes what he understands and 
one understands only in proportion to becoming himself that which he 
understands. In calling 'subjectivity' the truth Kierkegaard is, of course, using 
a secondary meaning of 'true', true as 'conformable to a standard'. Ultimately, 
for Kierkegaard 'subjectivity' alone is 'untruth'. It must have objective truth 
as its correlate or it must give up the predicate 'truth' (Journals....396, 488).  
I turn now to the application of Kierkegaard's theory to education. Just 
as I have divided the theory of subjectivity into two separate aspects: the 
epistemological and the ethical; so I shall briefly discuss Kierkegaard's 
contribution to philosophy of education under those two headings. 
Regarding the ethical aspect, we see that according to his theory all knowing 
has an ethical dimension. We are responsible for what we learn in that we 
have the obligation to use it for the furtherance of moral ends. Furthermore, 
the knowledge which is most to be sought is ethical knowledge. The primary 
aim of all the institutions of society should be to produce morally sensitive 
persons — even if success can never be guaranteed (given the assumption of 
human freedom). It is better to have good people than clever or materially 
successful people. It is better to be a good person, one absolutely committed 
to the ethical-religious dimension of life, than to be cultured or distinguished 
or successful. It follows from this premise that there can be no such thing as 
neutral teaching regarding moral values. Either you are committed to handing 
down the tradition of ethical truths to children from the earliest ages 
upwards or you have failed to see the significance of moral truth (Curtis & 
Mays, 1978, p. 10). 
Knowing how to make ethical decisions, knowing how to treat other 
people, are of far more importance than knowing anything else. Kierkegaard 
certainly sounds out of step with current educational policy when he writes: 
The main objection ... to natural science may simply ... be expressed thus, it is 
incredible that a man who has thought infinitely about himself as a spirit could think 
of choosing natural science ... as his life's work and aim (Swenson & Lowrie, 1941. P. 
176). 
No doubt this is an exaggeration. There is no good reason why science 
and morality cannot cooperate, why a man with spiritual insight cannot also 
be a person of moral and spiritual force. The question is one of priorities not 
of exclusions. Kierkegaard's contribution is not that he rightly understood 
the role of science but I hat he got his priorities right. He saw with 
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remarkable clarity that the moral existential dimension of life is what is of 
first importance (Curtis & Mays, 1978, p. 10-11). 
Regarding the epistemological aspect of subjectivity and its relationship 
to learning, the following must suffice. Only what is learned through 
experience, personally appropriated, is truly k nown. In this sense life is 
education. It is 'the curriculum one has to run through in order to catch up 
with oneself, and he who will not pass through this curriculum is helped very 
little by the fact that lie was born in the most enlightened age (Swenson & 
Hong, 1962. P. 38).  
Formal education should be an art, wherein the teacher aids the pupil 
to discover knowledge for himself, arousing his interest. 
What is really important in education is not that the child learns this or that, but that 
the mind is matured. That energy is aroused.... One can make oneself [a good head] if 
one will. Give a man energy, passion, and with that he is everything (Swenson & 
Lowrie, 1942, p. 177).  
This view of formal education may be contrasted with what 
Kierkegaard regards as a systematic, scientific process of education in which 
children are treated as products. 'If children could be shut up in the dark and 
force fed on an accelerated schedule like chickens, everything would certainly 
be organized to this end (Swenson & Lowrie, 1942, p.176). 
Finally, the teacher has an imcomparable role to play in the education 
process. The teacher does not merely teach a subject. In teaching a subject he 
or she teaches a way of life, whether the lc,icher realizes this or not. The 
teacher conveys values every Moment he is in the presence of the pupil. He 
'gesticulates with the whole of his existence (Lowrie, 1941, p. 45). 
For Kierkegaard, as for his teacher Socrates, all learning comes down 
to self-learning, even if it has originated in a dialogue. The person is 
responsible for what he learns and how he uses it. Only that  which really is 
appropriated and made his own is his truth (Curtis & Mays, 1978, p. 11). 
One may have known a thing many times and attempted it; and yet it is only by the 
deep inward movements, only by the indescrihable emotions of the heart, that for the 
first time you are convinced that what you have known belongs to you, that no 
power can take it from yiu; for only the truth which edifies in truth for you (Swenso 
& Lorie, 1942, p. 311). 
 
Rationality of Islamic Education Management  
Now, one way to go about reflecting about rationality and both 
―education‖ and ―education management‖ is simply to claim that we already 
know what true scientific rationality is all about- and both ―education‖ and 
―management‖  must ―conform‖ to this model in order to be a truly rational 
or truly scientific practice itself. And this view in some ways goes back to 
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Plato/Aristotle -  who determined that the way out of the resultant relativism 
and scepticism of pre-Socratic science was not to determine the right content 
or ― object of science – but rather the right‖ form‖ or ―method‖ of science. 
So a very dominant way of thinking about science in general in Western 
thought has been that the key to success is to know ―theoretically‖ what 
science is, and then to judge any particular practice, such as ―education‖, that 
claims to be scientific, against that particular theory. And at least from the 
enlightenment onwards (but really – already present in Plato and Aristotle), 
failure of an activity to meet a standard of science has meant that said activity 
was considered second rate at best and pernicious at worst (hence a 
denigration, for example, of the arts and religion). Of course, this general 
approach to defining scientific practice does not in the least solve all the 
problems – because even granting this model: what then ensues is a few 
thousand years of debate about precisely what that ―method‖ or ―form‖ of 
science is to be. Just to mention a few recent examples: we have ―positivist‖ 
agenda of amassing facts thought inductive principles in order to ―verify‖ a 
theory, or the idea that science progresses through an unending cycle of 
perhaps unjustified conjectures which one attempts to test and potentially 
―falsity‖ – a theory of scientific praxis associated with Karl Popper. But what 
interest me is that whether on is a ―positivist‖ or a ―popperian‖ – these 
apparently different ways of thinking about science actually share some very 
basic premises (Buckley, 2014).  
First, they share the notion that ―theory‖ is something distinct from 
―practice (praxis)‖ and that theory ―prescribes‖ or dictates practice: second, 
share presuppositions about ―objective‖ reality being something one can 
have pure ―facts‖ about – basically an assumption about ―nature‖ as some 
sort of self-subsistent reality; and third, that methods is itself something non-
questionable once established. Put strongly, the principle of falsification, for 
example, is itself not open to falsification. These are highly questionable 
presuppositions, rooted in a long tradition of thinking about science that can 
be challenged, and is often challenged today (Buckley, 2014). 
 
Narrative Model 
Because these challenges go deep enough – they call into question 
entire ways of thinking about science: in short, is it, in fact, the case that we 
have a crystal-clear theoretical sense of what science is and that is simply a 
matter of this clear sense dictating practice? The answer in many quarters is 
―no‖, and those who propose such a negative answer often are looking for 
other ways to describe ―science‖—and in doing so they often turn the 
ancient theory/practice dichotomy on its head: saying lets look at ―practices‖ 
and see what they tell us about ―rationality‖. They want to show that practice 
The Scientific Paradigm… 
  Vol. 2, No. 1, December 2015 M/1437 H  19 
is not always driven, or best understood by some preordained theory, but is 
guided by different models of knowing. What sort of models do these anti-
theorists propose? One of note might well be called the ―narrative‖ or 
―discursive‖ model (Buckley, 2014).  
I attended an Osler lecture a number of years age at McGill (I can‘t 
remember the speaker but I do more or less recall the content) wherein the 
essence seemed to be that when one describes medical learning – it (medical 
learning) is seen to possess a narrative structure. Not surprisingly then, she 
placed a great deal of emphasis on the role of case histories. Her argument 
was then strongly opposed to the rational-theory model: medical students 
learn most (or perhaps, she was implying, they learn ―best‖?) not by 
apprehending some theory of scientific practice and applying to medicine; 
rather they learn ―most‖ or ―best‖ by injecting themselves into a vast textual 
network of case histories. Learning medicine on this account is somewhat 
akin to a child learning to read: children surely do not apprehend some 
complicated semiotic theory and then read! Rather, they learn by being read 
to, by imitating their parents, by internalizing the stories themselves and then 
mapping then on to the squiggles on the page. Once having mastered this 
skill, they can then go on to enrich their textual network – and a truly skillful 
reader is one who has entered into a complex wed of stories – such that a 
reference to Dante in Joyce‘s Portrait of an Artist as a Young Man is grasped 
(either implicitly or explicitly) and the next is alive with meaning. There are 
many intriguing aspects to this notion, and it does seem to bear thinking 
about in terms of social work education and practice (Buckley, 2014).  
If I recall correctly, I thought at the time and probably still do think 
that this speaker may have pushed the ―narrative‖ model a little too far; in a 
way swinging to the opposite pole from our first  rational-theory model – 
science/medicine is basically what we say it is. In doing so, she did not 
provide any genuine account of the basic structure of narrative – what makes 
something identifiable as a story, nor any principle of discrimination about 
what makes one story better than another. And so while I deeply appreciated 
her motives to provide a more descriptive rather than prescriptive account of 
medical learning and practice – I think more must be thought out before I 
accept wholeheartedly the ―narrative‖ model (Buckley, 2014). 
Political Model  
A third model I can be envisioned – and here I am relying on 
sociologists of science such as Bruno Latour: might be called the ―political‖ 
model. Here we enter a middle ground between a scientific ideology that 
dictates praxis and a descriptive approach that ends up not able to give a 
thorough account of the conditions of possibility for there being such a thing 
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as a narrative. The result is that Bruno Latour gives a far more sophisticated 
– and complex account of scientific rationality. A few highlights: first, contra 
model #1, he is very critical of the idea of ―nature‖ as some sort of external, 
unifying entity that could always be turned to as home base. Put another way, 
he assaults the classic fact/value distinction as a certain type of ―two - 
chamber‖ system – where discussion takes place in the realm of values but 
the arbitration of that discussion takes place in the realm of nature. He 
introduces in his typology of science an extremely complicated ―four-
chamber‖ model wherein within each chamber facts and values were 
recognized as co-existing – but in differing hierarchical relationship. What 
―nature‖ ―is‖ (and I think the corollary to what ―nature‖ is for science in 
general could probably be3 called ―knowledge for educators‖) – what this 
―nature‖ or ―welfare‖ ―is‖ – is no longer something outside the practice of 
science that seeks to know it or of the practices which seek to promote it – 
but nature/knowledge is itself the product of political discussion (and here 
he might be said to be ending towards the narrative side); nevertheless the 
political discussion has strict constitutional requirements which generate its 
stability and informs it with principles of distinction. Hence, to say that ―all‖ 
science (and hence, ―all‖ social work too) is politics is not to make science or 
education or management into some sort of free for all, nor to divest it of its 
concern for ―nature‖ or ―welfare‖, but it is to recognize that the ―concern‖ 
itself is part the process of establishing ―nature‖ and to set fort rules of 
legitimization (legislation) which guide the process, lend it some stability, but 
do not petrify the system (laws change, after all) (Buckley, 2014). 
Athletic Model 
Running in Jakarta earlier this week; I cannot resist proposing a further 
model: which I name the ―athletic‖ model. This model incorporates some 
aspects of the previous models. On this account, being a good scientist or a 
good teacher/educator or a good manager is somewhat akin to being a good 
athlete. Athletes like our young child learning to read, surely do not learn nor 
master their sport through theory. No amount of theory is going to make me 
into an NBA player – though even I might be able to help the Toronto 
Raptors at this point. There are politically determined rules of the game, but 
these rules are conditions having the rules does not in itself produce 
―generate‖ a good hockey. And as we know, these rules are not immutable; 
though, it must be said, they also cannot be tinkered with lightly. One 
advantage of athletics, and the formation and practice of good athletes as a 
model for thinking about education and management is that it adds a more 
explicit bodily dimension to the previous models. Being a skillful athlete 
means possessing a type of knowledge – but surely not of a theoretical type 
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(!) [It would indeed, it seems to me, disqualify most professional athletes 
were we to demand such theoretical knowledge]. The knowledge is probably 
best named ―body-knowledge‖, and it is a combination of natural ability, 
physique, training, aptitude, personality, and so forth. It seems to me not 
inappropriate to think of the skillful educator or the caring manager as 
having acquired just such a bodily knowledge, expressed in good decisions 
under pressure, the right word or touch at the right time (Buckley, 2014). 
Towards an “artistic” and an “ethical” model 
What I am doing here is not really trying to champion one model 
(though I clearly have my favorite), but simply to get our minds thinking 
about the different ways one imagine scientific rationality in general and 
social practices such as education and management in particular. But of 
course, as one runs through these models, a strange conclusion emerges. 
Since our view of scientific rationality has for so long been enframed by 
model number one – that is, we almost cannot imagine ―science‖ when it 
comes to describing activities, such as social work perhaps, that more closely 
correspond to our other models. What other name could we call these 
activities? Well, two rather old names come to mind. The first is ―arts‖. Here 
we may simply be invoking yet another model – an aesthetic model – that in 
some way incorporates successfully as well many of the elements of the 
models we have discussed: a successful artist too seems to be skilled in a 
bodily way in  a manner akin to an athlete; with perhaps one additional 
advantage made more explicit. Namely, the work of art lives on after the 
artist disappears from the scene; producing effects not imagined and bringing 
pleasure to unknown admirers. This seems particularly appropriate to the 
labour of education, where the benefits and effects of success live on in 
countless ways and touch lives unknown to you at the moment (Buckley, 
2014). 
Which brings us to another model, also very old. And I suppose we 
would have to call this the ―ethical‖ model. For Aristotle, the virtues were 
divided into two groups: the moral virtues and intellectual virtues. And while 
he gave preference to the intellectual virtues (and hence, he does in some 
ways lay at the base of model #1); it may be appropriate to look the moral 
virtues as interesting models for the ―virtue‖ of practicing social work. To be 
morally virtuous for Aristotle is to act in a manner appropriate to the 
situation. This is why a virtue such as ―courage‖ can shift from event to 
event. For Aristotle, it is not courageous to run alone into an army of spear-
waving charging Spartans – it is, rather, not only stupid but displays the vice 
of recklessness however it is also a vice, ―cowardice‖, to run away from a 
mouse. Being courageous is to learn by practice, by listening to your elders, 
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by hearing the ancient stories and emulating the heroes of old, to do the right 
thing in the right situation. This learning is not the mastery of a theory, but is 
rather a learned practice that he calls – interestingly - a ―habit‖. It is an 
intuitive, bodily, habituated sense of what is right, of what is just. Virtue may 
not always lead to success, but it places one in a position to assess one‘s past 
failures and to aim for improvement in the future (Buckley, 2014). 
It occurs to me that by ending with this vague suggestion that social 
work skill may be acquired and practiced in a manner rather analogous 
to Aristotle‘s treatment of the acquisition of ―virtue‖, my talk has, led 
to a new problem – what is the relation between ethics and religion. 
How is that religion might ―properly‖ inscribe an ―ethical‖ attitude? An 
excellent philosophical question – but one for another day!(Buckley, 
2014). 
 
Phenomenological Approaches in Islamic Education Management 
Research  
The approachs of phenomenological research as well as the 
development of theory, concepts, and proccesses involved in human science 
inquiry come from the Duquesne Studies in Phenomenological Psychology 
(Giori et al. 1971-1983). The approach involves a return to experience in 
order to obtain comprehensive descriptions that provide the basis for a 
reflective structural analysis that portrays the essences of the experience. The 
approach ―seeks to disclose and elucidate the phenomena of behaviour as 
they manifest themselves in their perceived immediacy‖ (van Kaam, 1966. P. 
15). The human scientist determines the underlying structures of an 
experience by interpreting the originally given descriptions of the situation in 
wich the experience occurs. The researcher can let the phenomena speak for 
themselves (Moustakas, 1994: 11-13).  
The steps involved in empirical phenomenological studies as outlined 
by von Eckartesberg (1986) follow: 1) the problem and question 
formulation—the phenomenon. The researcher delinecates s focus of 
investigation....formulates a question in such a way that it is understandable 
to others; 2)  the data generating situation—the protocol life text. 
Researchers start with descriptive narrative provided by subjects who are 
viewed as co-researchers...we query the person and engage in dialogue, or we 
combine the two; 3) the data analysis—explication and interprtation. Once 
collected, the data are read and scrutinized so as to reveal their occurrence 
and clustering ...emphasis is on the study of configurations of 
meaning....involving both the structure of meaning and how it is created (von 
Eckartsberg, 1986.p. 27). 
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In deriving evidence in phenomenological investigations, the scientific 
researcher establishes and carries out a series of methods and procedures that 
satisfy the requirements of an organized, disciplined and systematic study. 
These include: 1) discovering a topic and question rooted in autobiographical 
meanings and values. as well as involving social meanings and significance; 2) 
conducting a comprehensive review of the professional and research 
literature; 3) constructing a set of criteria to locate appropriate co-researchers; 
4) providing co-researchers with instructions on the nature and purpose of 
the investigation, and developing an agreement that includes obtaining 
informed consent, insuring confidentiality and delineating the responsibility 
action of the primary researcher and research participant, consistent with 
ethical principles of research; 5) conducting and recording a lengthy person-
to-person interview that focuscs on a bracketed topic and question. A follow-
up interview may also be needed; 6) organizing and analyzing the data to 
facilitate development of individual textural and structural descriptions, a 
composite textural description, a composite structural description, and a 
synthesis of textural and structural meanings and essences (Moustakas, 1994, 
p. 103-104). 
The above methodological requirements may be organized in terms of 
methods of preparation. Methods of collecting data, and methods of 
organizing and analyzing data. A method offers a systematic way of 
accomplishing something orderly and disciplined, with care and rigor. 
Procedures or techniques make up a method, provide a direction and steps to 
be followed, and move a study into action. Every method in human science 
research is open ended. There are no definitive or exclusive requirement. 
Each research project holds its own integrity and establishes its own methods 
and procedures to facilitate the flow of the investivatior and the collection of 
data (Moustakas, 1994, p. 104). 
Formulating the Question  
The first challenge of the MPI researcher, in preparing to conduct a 
phenomenological investigation, is to arrive at a topic and question that have 
both social meaning and personal significance. The question must be stated 
in clear and concrete terms. The key words of the question should be 
defined, discussed, and clarified so that the intent and purpose of the 
investigation are evident. The position of each key word, or focus, of the 
question determines what is primary in pursuing the topic and what data will 
be collected (Moustakas, 1994, p. 104). 
In phenomenological research, the question grows out of an intense 
tangents of it may complicate an articulation of a manageable and specific 
question. Yet this process of permitting aspects of the topic to enter into 
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awareness is essential in the formulation of a core question that will remain 
viable and alive throughout the investigation. A human science research 
question has definite characteristics: 1) It seeks to reveal more fully the 
essences and meanings of human cxperiCnce; 2) It seeks to uncover the 
qualitative rather than the quantitative factors in behavior and experience; 3) 
It engages the total self of the research participant, and sustains personal and 
passionate involvement; 4) It does not seek to predict or to determine causal 
relationships; 5) It is illuminated through careful, comprehensive 
descriptions, vivid and accurate renderings of the experience. rather than 
measurements, ratings, or scores (Moustakas, 1994: 104-105). 
Validation Of Data  
A good example of validation of data is borrowed from Humphrey's 
(1991) study of "searching for life's meaning." Humphrey interviewed 14 co-
researchers in exploring his topic description of their experience. He 
requested of each participant that she or he carefully examine the unified 
description of the search for life's meaning and that additions and corrections 
be made. Of the 13 who responded, 8 stated that the synthesis was accurate 
and that no changes were needed.  
Humphrey comments:   
The fourteenth was contacted twice by mail and twice by phone, but did not respond. 
Three offered important suggestions concerning omissions or questions of emphasis. 
Two indicated that they did not believe that the "dark side" of their search for 
meaning—the terrifying sense of meaningless or universal chaos which they 
sometimes experienced—was adequately represented.... This was an eye-opening 
confrontation to me, inviting me to look more closely at my own fear of the 
existential void and hidden desperation which might lead one to hold onto something 
rather than risking the apparent abyss of meaninglessness. I had thought that my 
heuristic exploration of my own scared had been thorough.... I had been aware that 
two transcribers had resigned from continuing to work on my project while they were 
working on two different research interviews right at the point at which the 
participants were describing comprehensively their fear meaninglessness. Cleary this 
is a powerful and difficult aspect of the search for meaning which some of us would 
rather avoid. Fortunately, the step of participant validation highlighted the reduced 
emphasis on this aspect. I returned to . . . my own search and also reexamined the 
research interviews. (pp. 81.82) (Reprinted by permission of the author) (Moustakas, 
1994, p. 111).  
 
Humphrey revised the "synthesis" statement, significantly expanding 
the qualities and meanings of the dark side of searching for life's meaning. 
 
Review of The Professional and Research Literature 
Another method of preparing to conduct a phenomenological study 
involved review of the professional and research literature connected with 
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the research topic and question. The investigator assesses the prior relevant 
studies; distinguishes their designs, methodologies, and findings from the 
investigator's own study; and indicates what new knowledge he or she is 
seeking and expects to obtain (Moustakas, 1994, p. 111). 
Cooper (1989) has identified four major kinds of literature review. The 
integrative review presents the "state of knowledge" relevant to a topic and 
draws conclusions from the many separate studies that arc reviewed. These 
studies typically define the problem, outline the methods of data collection, 
evaluate the data, make analyses and interpretations, and present the findings. 
The theoretical review analyzes the theories that account for the existence of 
the phenomenon. The methodological review examines the rcscarch 
methods developed and utilized in the published works. The thematic review 
organizes the core themes presented in the studies and presents their findings 
within the core themes. Regardless of the approach, both formal and 
informal methods are used (Moustakas, 1994, p. 112). 
Manual and of informal sources might include a follow-up of 
references cited in review papers on the topic as well as those appearing on 
book lists obtained from library indexes; browsing in bookstores and 
libraries, contacts with experts on the topic, conversations with professors 
and other students; documents of relevant government agencies; studies of 
comments on the topic from past reviews of the litcraturc; and attendance at 
professional meetings. In determining the key descriptors for locating 
rcfcicnccs, the Thesaurus of Psychological Index Terms and comprehensive 
dictionaries are utilized (Moustakas, 1994, p. 112).  
From his survey of 57 authors of research reviews covering psychology 
and education, Cooper (1989) determined that the significance of the 
references were derived from various searches. The most central were: 
computer searches of abstract databases, such as ERIC and Psych-INFO; 
manual searches of abstract databases; computer searches of a , citation 
index, such as SSCI; manual searches of a citation index; references in review 
papers written by others; and references in books Cooper (1989) summarizes 
the purposes for using the technical and nontechnical literature. The 
technical literature includes: theoretical sensitivity regarding concepts and 
relationships in order to look for evidence from one's own research that 
confirms or rejects the relevancy of the concepts and relationships and in 
order to learn ways of approaching and interpreting one's data; secondary 
sources of data may provide useful interviews and field notes as well as 
descriptive materials of relevant events, actions, and perspectives of the 
research participant; guides to questions to explore with one's co-researchers-
, ideas helpful in developing one's theory, and supplementary validation of 
the accuracy of one's research findings (pp. 51-52). The nontechnical 
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literature "can be used as primary data, especially historical and biographical 
studies. In most studies they (i.e., letters, biographies, diaries, reports, 
videotapes, and newspapers) are important sources of data, supplementing 
the most usual interviews and observations" (Cooper. 1989. p. 55 in 
Moustakas, 1994, p. 112-113). 
 
Methods of Data Collection 
Typically in the phenomenological investigation the long interview is 
the method through which data is collected on the topic and question. The 
phenomenological interview involves an informal, interactive process and 
utilizes open-ended comments and questions. Although the primary 
researcher may in advance develop a series of questions aimed at evoking a 
comprehensive account of the person's experience of the phenomenon, these 
are varied, altered, or not used at all when the co-researcher shares the full 
story of his or her experience of the bracketed question (Moustakas, 1994, p. 
114).  
Often the phenomenological interview begins with a social 
conversation or a brief meditative activity aimed at creating a relax; d and 
trusting atmosphere. Following this opening, the investigator suggests that 
the co-researcher take a-few moments to focus on the experience, moments 
of particular awareness and impact, and then to describe the experience fully. 
The interviewer is responsible for creating a climate in which the research 
participant will feel comfortable and will respond honestly and 
comprehensively (Moustakas, 1994, p. 114).  
General Interview Guide 
Sometimes a general interview guide, or topical guide, is used when the 
co-researcher's story has not tapped into the experience qualitatively and with 
sufficient meaning and depth. Broad questions, such as the following, may 
also facilitate the obtaining of rich, vital, substantive descriptions of the co-
researcher's experience of the phenomenon. The language and timely way in 
which the questions are posed facilitates full disclosures of the co-
researcher's experience. 1) What dimensions, incidents and people intimately 
connected with the experience stand out for you? 2) How did the experience 
affect you? What changes do you associate with the experience? 3) How did 
the experience affect significant others in your life? 4) What feelings were 
generated by the experience? 5) What thoughts stood out for you? 6) What 
bodily changes or states were you aware of at the time? 7) Have you shared 
all that is significant with reference to the cxperitnce? (Moustakas, 1994, p. 
116).   
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Organization And Analysis Of Data 
Organization of data begins when the primary researcher places the 
transcribed interviews before him or her and studies the material through, 
the methods and procedures of phenomenal analysis. The procedures include 
horizonalizing the data and regarding every horizon or statement relevant to 
the topic and question as having equal value. From the textures and 
structures into the meanings and essences of the phenomenon are 
constructed (Moustakas, 1994, p. 118).  
 
Modification Of The Van Kaam Method Of Analysis Of Phenomenological Data 
Using the complete transcription of each research participant; 1) 
Listing and Preliminary grouping.  List every expression relevant to the 
experience- (Horizonalization); 2) Reduction and Elimination: To determine 
the Invariant Constituents: Test each expression for two requirements; (a) 
Does it contain a moment of the experience that is a necessary and sufficient 
constituent for understanding it? (b) Is it possible to abstract and label it? If 
so, it is a horizon of the experience. Expressions not meeting (tie above 
requirements are eliminated. Overlapping, repetitive, and vague expressions 
are also eliminated or presented in more exact descriptive terms. The 
horizons-that remainare the invariant constituents of the experience; 3) 
Clustering and Thematizing the Invariant Constituents: Cluster (he invariant 
constituents of the experience that are related into a thematic label. The 
clustered and labeled constituents arc the core themes of the experience; 4) 
Final Identification of the Invariant Constituents and Themes by 
Application: Validation. Check the invariant constituents and their 
accompanying theme against the complete record of the research participant. 
(1) Are they expressed explicitly in the complete transcription? (2) Are they 
compatible if not explicitly expressed? (3) If they arc not explicit or 
compatible. they are not relevant to the co-researcher's experience and 
should be deleted; 5) Using the relevant, validated invariant constituents and 
themes, construct for each co-researcher an Individual Textural Description 
of the experience. Include verbatim examples from the transcribed interview; 
6) Construct for each co-rcscarclier an Individual Structural Description of 
the experience based on the Individual Textural Description and Imaginative 
Variation; 7) Construct for each research participant a Textural-Structural 
Description of the meanings and essences of the experience. incorporating 
the invariant constituents and themes (Moustakas, 1994, p. 120-121). By the 
explantion, there are statement that from the individual temural-structural 
descriptions, develop a composite description of the meanings any' essences 
of the experience, -representing the group as a whole. 
 
Philip Buckley, Irawan 
28  Vol. 2, No. 1, December 2015 M/1437 H  
Modification of The Stevick -Cola Izzi- Keen Method of Analysis of Phenomenological 
Data 
A second method of organizing and analyzing phenomenological data 
is derived from any modification of methods of analysis suggested by Stevie!: 
(1971), Coiaizzi (1973), and Keen (1975). Each of the steps is presented in 
the appropriate order of analysis; 1) Using a phenomenological approach, 
obtain a full description of your own experience of (he phenomenon); 2) 
From the verbatim transcript of your experience complete the following 
steps: (a). Consider each statement with respect to significance for 
description of the experience; (b). Record all relevant statements; (c). List 
each nonrepetitive, nonoverlapping statement. These are the invariant 
horizons or meaning units of the experience; (d). Relate and cluster the 
invariant meaning units into themes; (c). Synthesize the invariant meaning 
units and themes into a description of the textures of the experience. Include 
verbatim examples; (f). Reflect on your own textural description. Through 
imaginative variation, construct a description of the structures of your 
experience; (g). Construct a textural-structural description of the meanings 
and essences of your experience; 3) From the verbatim transcript of the 
experience of each of the other co-researcher,  complete the above steps, a 
through; 4) From the individual textural-structural descriptions of all co-
researchers' experiences, construct a composite textural-structural description 
of the meanings and essences of the experictice, integrating- all individual 
textural structural descriptions into a universal description of the experience 
rcprcscnting the group as a whole (Moustakas, 1994: 122). 
In the sections that follow, from various research investigations, I will 
offer examples of horizonalization; delimiting to invariant horizons or 
meaning units, clustering the invariant constitucpts into themes. Individual 
textural and individual structural descriptions, composite textural and 
composite structural descriptions, and synthesis of textural and structural 
meanings and essences. 
 
CONCLUSION 
In order to become a well-established science, Islamic Education 
Management should not be overly dominated by theology. Therefore, Islamic 
Education Management can build the scientific foundation of 
phenomenology, apart from the scientific method positivistic. 
Phenomenology can be an alternative formulation of science MPI because: 1) 
is natural (no reduction on pre-thought); 2) can reach the essence of the 
phenomenon; 3) systematic and 4) suitable for digging symptoms theological, 
historical, sociological and psychological principals and education managers 
Islam. There are four models of epistemology phenomenology that can be 
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used as a basis in developing science education management, namely; (1) 
Narative; (2) Political; (3) Atletic  dan 4) Artistic dan Etical model. Stages of 
research-based education management can take the phenomenology of 
qualitative research phases. There are some differences between ordinary 
qualitative research with phenomenological qualitative research, namely 1) 
return to experience in order to obtain comprehensive descriptions that 
provide the basis for a reflective structural analysis that portrays the essences 
of the experience; 2) seeks to disclose and elucidate the phenomena of 
behaviour as they manifest themselves in their perceived immediacy; 3) 
scientist determines the underlying structures of an experience by 
interpreting the originally given descriptions of the situation in wich the 
experience occurs. The researcher can let the phenomena speak for 
themselves. The steps involved in empirical phenomenological studies as 
outlined by follow: 1) the problem and question formulation—the 
phenomenon. The researcher delinecates as focus of 
investigation....formulates a question in such a way that it is understandable 
to others; 2) the data generating situation—the protocol life text. Researchers 
start with descriptive narrative provided by subjects who are viewed as co-
researchers...we query the person and engage in dialogue, or we combine the 
two; 3) the data analysis—explication and interprtation.  
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